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Abstract: The struggle for queer people to be recognised as full sexual citizens continues to be
thwarted by the existence of religious exceptions to equality law. These exceptions reactivate and
legitimise the historical oppression of queer people, who have long been plagued by the Four
Horsemen of Homophobia. War—because the language of war is often used in the context of
religious conscientious objection to gay equality. Famine—because public spending cuts have led
to religious groups filling the gap in service provision. Pestilence—because old tropes of infection,
promiscuity, and corruption of youth persist, albeit masked by a concern for religious freedom. Finally,
Death—because exceptions to equality law operate to limit the citizenship of non-heterosexuals.
This paper argues that religiously motivated attempts to restrict queer people’s participation, in a
hetero- and theonormative public space, constitutes harm which can be characterised as degrading
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The state must be
more interventionist in its pursuit of genuine gay citizenship, and remove religious exceptions to
equality law; otherwise, it is implicated in the constructive delegation of religious homophobia.
Keywords: equality; discrimination; religious exceptions; sexual orientation; homophobia; harm;
Article 3 ECHR
1. Introduction
The Equality Act 2010 includes both religion and sexual orientation as ‘protected
characteristics’ (S4). It forbids the use of these characteristics as a basis for both direct (s13)
and indirect (s14) discrimination. Nevertheless, exceptions have been granted to religious
organisations vis-à-vis homosexuality in employment (Schedule 9) and in the provision
of goods and services (Schedule 23). This paper argues that restrictions on gay, lesbian,
bisexual and queer lives, through religious exceptions to equality law, operate as harms
which constitute degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR), and which implicate the state in constructive delegation of
homophobia. The paper begins by setting the religious exceptions that exist in equality
law in the context of the hetero-and theonormative assumptions that permeate society. It
goes on to explain how these exceptions operate to mask the homophobia at their core,
and to analyse, through a liberal and then a Queer lens, how they result in harm to non-
heterosexuals. The struggle for non-heterosexuals to be recognised as full sexual citizens in
the UK is still plagued by the Four Horsemen of Homophobia. War—because the language
of war is often used in the context of religious conscientious objection to gay equality.
Famine—because cutbacks to public spending have impacted on LGBTQ+ support services,
with faith-based organisations increasingly filling the gap in provision. Pestilence—because
old tropes of infection, promiscuity, and corruption of youth persist, albeit masked by a
disavowal of homophobia. For example, the Catholic Care adoption agency relied on these
tropes in their unsuccessful bid to exclude same-sex couples from their service (Catholic Care
v Charity Commission, FTC/52/2011). Finally, Death—because religious attempts to limit
‘sexual citizenship’ (Weeks 1998), to limit the freedom of non-heterosexuals to participate
in the quotidian activities of life, render them effectively (re)closeted and indeed ‘socially
dead’ (Blasius 1994).
Laws 2021, 10, 83. https://doi.org/10.3390/laws10040083 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/laws
Laws 2021, 10, 83 2 of 17
1.1. Religious Exce ptions to Equality Law
Religious exceptions are permitted in employment where it is for the purposes of an
organised religion (Sch 9, para 2), which gives religious organisations ‘a zone of liberty
to . . . hire their own members and enforce their own lifestyle norms that are otherwise
discriminatory’ (Esau 2000). There are further exceptions for religious organisations relating
to services and public functions, premises and associations, where: (i) a restriction is
necessary to comply with the purpose of the organisation; or (ii) to avoid causing offence
to members of the religion or belief that the organisation represents. The exception applies
where: (i) it is necessary to comply with the doctrine of the organisation; or (ii) in order to
avoid conflict with the strongly held convictions of members of the religion or belief that
the organisation represents (Sch 23, para 2). The Act does not include specific exceptions
for religious individuals. However, a series of cases, discussed later in this paper, have
invoked claims for individual exceptions on grounds of religious conscience. It is submitted
that the exceptions granted to religious organisations have created an environment where
individual conscience claims can be put forward in opposition to queer citizenship. Even if
most of them ultimately fail, these claims have discursive costs that contribute to queer
people’s continued experience of harmful and degrading treatment at the hands of religious
conservatives. Exceptions for organisations and claims of individual conscience both
perpetuate the fallacy that religion deserves special allowances because of a purported
necessary relationship between religious belief and disapproval of homosexuality. This
binary approach not only negates the experience of queer religious people; it also masks
the state’s constructive delegation of homophobia.
There is a history of religious opposition to the extension of equality law to include
queer people within its embrace. For example, the first draft of the Employment Equality
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 (EESOR) included a requirement that sexual orienta-
tion discrimination was only permissible if it was a ‘genuine occupational requirement’ (reg
7). The Church of England sought to widen the scope of the exception, fully recognising
that ‘this might otherwise constitute direct or indirect discrimination related to sexual
orientation’ (Fittall 2003, cited by Richards J in R (Amicus) v Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry [2004] EWHC 860). The EESOR debates highlight the discourse that personal reli-
gious sensibilities are somehow special and are thus worthy of special exceptions. EESOR
(re)established a hierarchy of rights in favour of religious privilege. The exception was
retained, albeit slightly modified, in the subsequent Equality Act 2010 (Schedule 9, para. 2).
After EESOR, the 2006 Equality Act extended existing laws prohibiting discrimination
in the provision of goods, services, facilities, and premises on grounds of race so as to
cover religion and faith. Despite religious opposition, the Act also included an amendment
tabled by the House of Lords, requiring the government to introduce secondary legislation
prohibiting discrimination and harassment on grounds of sexual orientation. The ensu-
ing debate illustrates how religious conservatives were careful to disclaim homophobia,
couching their opposition instead in terms of the need to balance ‘the right not to be
discriminated against on the one hand and the right to freedom of religion on the other’,
and calling for ‘early discussions with the Churches and other faith communities on how
their interests can be reflected in the provisions’ (Bishop of Newcastle Martin Wharton, HL
Debate, 9 November 2005, c 630). There was also concern for how the law would affect
‘ordinary people’ who provided goods and services such as bed and breakfast facilities in
their own homes (Lord Stoddart, ibid., c 631), reflecting a religious imperative to maintain
the ‘boundaries between homosexuality and private and domestic dwellings’ (Johnson and
Vanderbeck 2014, p. 108). The image of the beleaguered “ordinary person” who would
have to suffer public homosexuality was a key feature of this opposition.
Religious objections to the proposals culminated in significant exemptions for North-
ern Ireland. In an echo of the 2003 Regulations, restrictions against lesbians and gay men
were permitted if ‘necessary to comply with the doctrine of the organisation’ or ‘so as to
avoid conflicting with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant number of the
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religious followers’ (Reg 16(5)). Nevertheless, there were moves to have the Regulations
annulled, with Lord Morrow arguing that they posed a threat to ‘religious liberty’:
They make it possible for homosexual activists to sue people who disagree
with a homosexual lifestyle because of their religious beliefs. Bed and breakfast
owners and Christian old people’s homes will be sued for not giving a double
bed to homosexual civil partners. Wedding photographers will be made to pay
compensation for not taking bookings for civil partnership ceremonies. Christians
in business could even be sued for sharing their faith with customers. Worst of
all, they require religious organisations to choose between obedience to God and
obedience to the state (HL Debate, January 2007, c 180).
Lord Morrow paints a vivid image of religious service providers being persecuted
by organised homosexuals with a litigious agenda to promote their ‘lifestyle’ (whatever
that may be). From the historical view that homosexuals suffered from an excess of desire,
’homosexual activists’ now appear to be suffering from an excessive desire for equality
(Brickell 2001).
Following reports from The Equalities Review (2007) and The Discrimination Law
Review (2007) the Equality Act 2010 consolidated and replaced previous equality legisla-
tion. Service providers were prevented from discriminating against any of the protected
characteristics—but this remained subject to the religious exceptions. The general duty
on local authorities to promote equality was extended to encompass sexual orientation
(s 149). This drew strong (albeit unsuccessful) protests from religious groups, but other
religious protests against equality were more successful. For example, the Equality Bill had
originally sought to include a proportionality test to the employment exception, requiring
religious organisations to show that restrictions on employees’ sexual orientation were a
‘proportionate means’ of adhering to religious doctrine or avoiding offence to the religious
convictions of a significant number of the religion’s faithful (2009 Sch 9 para 2). Following
opposition from the Church of England and the Catholic Church, the proportionality test
was dropped (Johnson and Vanderbeck 2014), giving religion a uniquely privileged sta-
tus in the Equality Act 2010. These bespoke provisions allow greater scope for anti-gay
discrimination than that available to other employers, and underline the theonormative
assumption that religion is “special”. Religious conservatives also sought to widen the
remit of the exceptions that existed in the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations
2007 (EASOR). Familiar arguments and tropes were reactivated in the course of this oppo-
sition to extended gay rights. For example, Lord Mackay attempted to include protection
for those with a ‘genuine conscientious objection’ who wished to withhold goods and
services from lesbians and gay men (HL Committee, 13 January 2010, cc 591-2). In addition,
the Bishop of Chichester warned against the ‘profoundly dangerous tendency’ to try to
‘privatise belief’ (ibid., c 600). These attempts may have failed, but the new Act nonetheless
reproduced the broad scope of exceptions granted to religious organisations, enabling them
to lawfully discriminate against queer people in the provision and use of goods, services,
facilities and premises.
These religious exceptions retell an ancient story that something is wrong with same-
sex desire. Christian moral ideas pertaining to the body and desire have historically been
encoded into legislation and continue to permeate legal discourse. However, over time
there has been a gradual shift in conservative religious discourse regarding sexuality:
from the original, explicitly religious imperative, through the discourses of “contagion”
surrounding HIV and AIDS and the “corruption of youth” around Section 28, to the
appeals to heteronormative family life made to oppose same-sex marriage (Johnson and
Vanderbeck 2014). Most recently, there has been a move in favour of arguments based on
rights rather than morality. This discursive shift has enabled religious conservatism to
disavow homophobia while seeking conscience-based exceptions to same-sex equality in
arenas such as marriage, adoption, employment and the provision of goods and services.
Indeed, the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013 contains a ‘quadruple lock’: religious
organisations must ‘opt-in’ to solemnise SS marriage in places of worship; no-one can be
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forced to opt-in; no anti-discrimination law will be contravened by not opting-in; and the
Churches of England and Wales are unable to opt-in at all.
Such accommodation is needed, it is argued, because equality law has created a
hierarchy of rights that disadvantages the manifestation of sincerely held religious belief.
As the former Archbishop of York argued, in the debate over the 2007 Regulations, ‘rather
than levelling the playing field for those who suffer discrimination . . . this legislation
effects a rearrangement of discriminatory attitudes and bias to overcompensate and skew
the field the other way’ (HL, 21 March 2007, c1309). This ignores the historical hierarchy of
rights in favour of religion that was further entrenched from EESOR onwards, finding
its current zenith in the Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Act 2013. Interestingly, the former
leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) had previously suggested that
the need for race equality legislation had passed (BBC News 2015, 12 March). Farage’s
racist rationale has similarities with the conservative religious narrative which has arisen in
response to increasing equality for gay people: these people—these ‘others’—now have too
much equality; the pendulum has swung too far the other way, and the law must redress
the balance.
Both narratives are grounded partly in a discourse of ‘British values’ (Department
for Education 2014, pp. 5–6). There is an underlying caveat to this, however: the small
print reminds us that hardworking, preferably white, Christian heterosexual families are
the preferred model. Others may be tolerated magnanimously in the spirit of Western
liberalism. For example, the report by the Christians in Parliament (2012) (Clearing the
Ground) uses the discourses of history and nation to bolster its arguments that Christians
are embattled victims of increasing secularism and same-sex equality. Having identified
recent changes in law and society as a challenge to Christians, the report goes on to
present Christianity as a venerable contrast to the vicissitudes of modernity, by grounding
Christianity in claims to historical authority. Christianity is presented as embedded in the
very character of the nation, with the implication that it is fundamental to its make-up:
‘Christianity has a rich cultural heritage in the UK. For more than 1600 years, it
has shaped the way people in the British Isles think and act, both personally and
publicly. It is by far the most significant single historical influence on our social
and political culture...’ (ibid., 73).
The Horsemen of War and Pestilence have been repeatedly invoked in the debates
on equality legislation. Discourses of national history, traditional values, and threats to
ordinary people have been deployed by religious conservatives to challenge increasing
LGBTQ+ equality. The next section highlights the hetero- and theonormativities in which
such tropes are grounded, before going on to discuss how religious exceptions are a cloak
for homophobia.
1.2. Normativities
As well as its claim on history, the argument from religious conscience would not be
possible without the alliance of hetero- and theonormativity. Heteronormativity assumes
that ‘heterosexuality is the normative form of human sexuality . . . the measure by which
all other sexual orientations are judged’ (Jung and Smith 1993, pp. 13–14, emphasis in
original). Theonormativity exists ‘when theism is the default, the standard, and everything
else is a deviation from this norm’ (Harvard Humanist 2012). The extent to which theism
has been socially constructed as ‘real’ is under-appreciated. The noun ‘atheist’ itself is
defined with reference to ‘theist’, and even the statement “I don’t believe in God” carries
with it a theonormative assumption. The word ‘god’ is invariably capitalised, in contrast to
those subjects of worship from other cultures (both historical and present). We do not say
“I don’t worship any gods” or “I don’t believe in your god”. As such, the idea of a god is
pervasive, even in liberal discourse. However, it is dangerous to allow this assumption
to go unchallenged. It not only continues to permeate our lawmaking (see for example
the Local Government (Religious etc. Observances) Act 2015; R (National Secular Society
& Anor.) v Bideford Town Council [2012] EWHC 175); it is also precisely what creates a
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space for ‘conscience’ talk to be used by religious organisations and individual religious
conservatives.
Giving space, in a hetero- and theonormative society, to religious conservatives to
use religious conscience to deny goods and services implicates the state in perpetuating
homophobia. There are three reasons for this. First, the state has a duty to ensure the
safety and security of its citizens (Hobbes [1651] 1996), and religious exceptions deny non-
heterosexuals equal rights to safety and security as embodied individuals. Second, law’s
historical relationship with religion continues to be the vehicle whereby ambivalence or
even distaste for homosexuality finds legal expression, albeit now cloaked in rights-based
arguments. The disclaiming of homophobia and the assimilation of rights arguments by
conservative religion disguises what is still a discourse grounded in heteronormativity
and theonormativity. Third, religious exceptions deny lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and
queer people equal sexual citizenship and thus equal dignity as human beings. A political
and legal regime that professes to be concerned with equality should attend to those parts
of the law that accord homophobia the legal legitimacy to compromise equal citizenship,
dignity and security.
2. Religious Exceptions as a Cloak for Homophobia
2.1. Religion and Homophobia
It could be argued that faith-based opposition to homosexuality is not equivalent to
homophobia, being based on a belief in the ‘revealed word’ of their god, and not simply
on an irrational fear of gay people. The ‘holy’ books of the world’s three main creedal
religions can be interpreted as forbidding homosexuality, and many believers accept these
interpretations as moral imperatives. Leaving aside the argument that religious belief is
inherently irrational (Dawkins 2006, cf Ward 2011), this denial of homophobia is not only
an example of sophistry; it also negates the lived experience of non-heterosexuals who
have suffered—and continue to suffer—at the hands of religious conservatism.
It is also worth noting here that Christian religious texts that refer to same-sex prac-
tice are very limited; the meaning of those that do exist (such as the story of Sodom and
Gomorrah) has also been contested (Boswell 1980). In other words, even if we are to take
seriously religious belief, it should not be conceded that the texts are static or unques-
tionable. They have been contested, reworked and reinterpreted over time and so their
meanings have shifted. This does not (necessarily) mean that believers are insincere in their
beliefs; however, it does permit a challenge to religious claims in their own terms. That
is, they are not only problematic in terms of rights conflicts, but also in terms of internal
consistency and logic. Some religious adherents may feel strongly that they are bound
by a fundamental, unchanging and unchangeable text; but this does not bear scrutiny in
broader historico-cultural-political terms.
The disavowal of homophobia by religious conservatives has been further facilitated
by their success in reframing the issue as a clash of rights. However, there is a qualitative
difference between the two types of rights claimed. Complaints of discrimination on sexual
orientation grounds are made either for equal benefits or access, or an end to discrimi-
nation. In contrast, religion-based claims seek exceptions so that religious individuals or
organisations do not have to abide by rules which apply to others. Thus, the discourse
of rights has been increasingly used by religious conservatives, but in pursuit of an aim
that is unlike other rights claims, namely ‘the right to deny equal, inclusive treatment
for queer people . . . where services are being offered to, or even on behalf of, the public’
(MacDougall and Short 2010). Religious use of rights arguments has been made in other
areas, such as conversion therapy (Clucas 2017). And the disavowal of homophobia has
been used by the religious right as both a shield and a sword against equality campaigners.
While MP Diane Abbott argued in support of protection against harassment for sexual
minorities, acknowledging that ‘some people use their religion as a vehicle for cultural
bigotry’ (HC Committee, 18 June 2009, c 308), MSP John Mason retorted that ‘one person’s
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bigotry is another person’s belief’ and extending harassment protection to homosexuals
would ‘create a risk to free speech’ of religious people (ibid.).
The underlying message to a non-heterosexual is that ‘unless I am being thrown in
prison or herded onto a cattle train, then it is not homophobia’ (Bliss 2014). For example, in
2014 the Irish television station, RTÉ, agreed a financial settlement with campaigners against
same-sex marriage, after a gay rights campaigner and drag queen had described them on
television as homophobic (Kealy and Horan 2014). Her response is worth reproducing at
some length:
So now Irish gay people find ourselves in a ludicrous situation where not only
are we not allowed to say publicly what we feel oppressed by, we are not even
allowed to think it because our definition has been disallowed by our betters . . .
And a jumped-up queer like me should know that the word “homophobia” is no
longer available to gay people. Which is a spectacular and neat Orwellian trick
because now it turns out that gay people are not the victims of homophobia—
homophobes are (Bliss 2014).
The legal endorsement of religious homophobia, by virtue of exceptions to equality
law, can be understood as a state-sponsored harm—the scope and degree of which can be
assessed by examining both liberal and Queer approaches to harm. This paper engages
with liberal analysis, but also recognises that arguments for law reform—for example,
through use of Article 3 ECHR—can be strengthened by understanding the power relations
that limit sexual citizenship. It is argued that a Foucaultian analysis of harm offers greater
analytical precision while also opening further possibilities as to how homophobic harm
can be assessed at state level. First, it is helpful to examine the relationship between
individual and institutional homophobia.
Homophobia is commonly used to describe a range of negative attitudes and be-
haviours towards same-sex desire and relationships. It can be manifested in critical or
hostile words or behaviour, from distaste or disapproval, through discrimination, to verbal
and physical violence. The psychologist George Weinberg (1972), who is credited with
the origin of the term, described homophobia in medical terms (see also Foucault 1978).
Interestingly, he also defined it with explicit reference to religion; it was ‘a fear of homosex-
uals which seemed to be associated with a fear of contagion, a fear of reducing the things
one fought for—home and family. It was a religious fear and it had led to great brutality
as fear always does’ (Weinberg 1972). “Holy” books can be used as authority for a range
of prejudices. For example, faith-based homophobia echoes the biblical justifications for
racism and sexism historically relied upon by religious conservatives in the United States:
‘Slavery, racial discrimination and segregation, and opposition to women’s rights were
all supported by strong religious arguments bolstered by citations to the Bible’ (Curtis
2012). As Curtis recognises, ‘as with race and gender, the greatest harm may be to the
human spirit, the harm inflicted when gays internalize the message sent by hostility and
discrimination’ (ibid.). As this paper contends, homophobia has become so sedimented
within legal, social and political discourse that, even when equality provisions have been
extended to non-heterosexuals, they have remained tainted.
2.2. Individual and Institutional Homophobia
The ILGA 2020 report highlights a link between state and individual discrimination:
In many countries across the region, and not only those with a documented
growth in official bias-motivated speech, there has been an equally sharp increase
in online hate-speech and physical attacks on LGBTI people, many of the latter
premeditated and brutal . . . Brexit, for instance, and the populist narrative sur-
rounding it, can be linked to an increase in anti-LGBTI hate crimes and incidents
in England and Wales from 5807 in 2014–15, to 13,530 in 2018–19. Other develop-
ments such as the banning of events in Armenia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and
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Turkey, and the prosecution of participants in Pride events in the latter, add to an
atmosphere lacking in a sense of safety.
At the institutional level, in 2020 the Home Office denied asylum to at least 3100
people who had fled countries that criminalise same-sex relationships. In August 2020, a
gay asylum seeker was refused because the immigration tribunal judge decided he did not
have a “gay demeanor” (ILGA 2020). Police records show that anti-LGBT hate crimes and
incidents in England and Wales increased from 5807 in 2014–15, to 13,530 in 2018–19, but the
prosecution rate fell from 20% to just 8% (ILGA 2020). Additionally, at the individual level,
the recent British Social Attitudes survey has revealed that ‘the acceptance of same-sex
relationships has slowed down in the UK, with a significant minority remaining hostile . . .
perhaps reflecting the marked divides between the attitudes of religious and non-religious
people in this sphere’ (BSA 36 2020). Nevertheless, two-thirds of people in Britain now say
that homosexuality is “not wrong at all”, an increase of almost 50 percentage points since
1983 (ibid., p. 6). The report states that ‘both public attitudes to and the law on sex and
sexuality are now profoundly out of step with the doctrinal position of many established
faiths in Britain, including that of most Christian denominations’ (ibid.).
Several studies, here and in the US, have identified a link between homophobic
discrimination and harm suffered by lesbians and gay men—including psychological harm.
A systematic review of mental disorders, suicide and self-harm amongst LGB (lesbian, gay
and bisexual) people in England found that ‘the social hostility, stigma and discrimination
that most LGB people experience is likely to be at least part of the reason for the higher
rates of psychological morbidity observed’ (King et al. 2008). Citing ‘difficulties growing
up in a world orientated to heterosexual norms and values and the negative influence of social
stigma against homosexuality’, it was suggested that ‘people who feel discriminated against
experience social stressors, which in turn increases their risk of experiencing mental health
problems’, adding that greater efforts are needed to prevent these issues arising (Chakratborty
et al. 2011, emphasis added).
At this point, it is helpful to consider in more detail the concept of harm, from both
liberal and Queer perspectives. The following section contrasts the liberal position on
harm with a Foucaultian-informed analysis, drawing on Kendall Thomas’s examination of
sodomy laws in the United States. Thomas’s approach is adopted to argue that religious
exemptions, viewed in terms of power relations, are one example of the state’s constructive
delegation of homophobia to conservative religious organisations and individuals.
3. Legal Homophobia as State-Sponsored Harm
3.1. The Liberal Position
Mill’s ‘harm principle’ holds that the need to prevent harm to persons other than the
actor is the only morally relevant reason in support of state coercion of the individual
(Mill [1859] 1985). The general liberal position is that the need to prevent harm to others is
always a relevant reason to engage the criminal law, if not necessarily fully determinative
(Feinberg 1984a). In his extended study of the moral limits of the criminal law, Feinberg
distinguishes between normative and non-normative senses of harm: the latter involves
some sort of setback to a person’s interests (Feinberg 1984a, vol I, p. 34), whereas the former,
normative sense involves a wrong which is a violation of a person’s rights. The harm
principle applies only to setbacks to interests that are also wrongs, and only to wrongs
which also involve a setback to interests:
Interests can be blocked or defeated by events impersonal in nature or by plain
bad luck. But they can only be ‘invaded’ by human beings . . . It is only when
an interest is thwarted through an invasion by self or others, that its possessor is
harmed in the legal sense . . . One person harms another . . . by invading, and
thereby thwarting or setting back, his interest (ibid., pp. 215–6).
In terms of what is to count as harm, Feinberg rules out ‘mere transitory disappoint-
ments, minor physical and mental “hurts” and a miscellany of disliked states of mind’,
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including moral indignation (ibid.). Feinberg also distinguishes between general and
normative senses of ‘offence’: general offence comprises myriad discomfiting mental states,
whereas normative offence refers only to those states caused by the wrongful—right-
violating—conduct of others (Feinberg 1984b, vol II, pp. 14–22). A newer and broader
definition of harm recognises that it ‘can be emotional, mental, and physical . . . caused
by condemning the other . . . avoiding his presence [and] discriminating against him’
(Nehushtan 2007). Read together, these definitions support the conclusion that anti-gay
discrimination does involve harm to lesbians and gay men, when understood within the
societal framework of heteronormativity and homophobia.
The liberal position on the conflict between religion and sexual orientation has, how-
ever, been influenced by its view that the state should be neutral among competing concep-
tions of what constitutes a good life (Rawls 1971). This neutrality is reflected in the fact
that both Article 8 (right to privacy) and Article 9 (freedom of religion) of the ECHR are
qualified rights, meaning that they can be limited if the restrictions are a proportionate
means of achieving a legitimate aim. Pitting two qualified Convention rights against each
other contributes to the zero-sum game that has hitherto dogged scholarly approaches
to this conflict. It also illustrates how vulnerable legal rights can be when liberal rights
discourse is appropriated to achieve illiberal aims (see Nehushtan 2015). However, it can
be argued that equality law should be recognised as value-based, rather than neutral. It
presumes certain values. For example, the Equality Act states that direct discrimination
because of a protected characteristic is never justified, so freedom of religion ends when it
expresses itself through unjust discrimination against others directly because of a protected
characteristic. Accordingly, the state has set the limits of liberal tolerance by relying on
content-based, rather than content-neutral, considerations.
A content-based approach to anti-discrimination law means, therefore, that the harm
principle should offer no comfort to people suffering profound offence on religious grounds:
people such as the Bulls, who were fundamentally opposed to letting double-bedded rooms
to guests other than heterosexual married couples (Bull v Hall [2013] UKSC 73). If they
view homosexuality as a sin, such people can be deeply offended by the idea of same-sex
intimacy happening even in private, but this does not justify the argument that they should
be granted exceptions on this basis. A content-neutral approach may agree that a feeling of
outrage at gay sex cannot qualify as liberal harm, because it involves privileging the moral
view that gay sex is wrong over the view that gay sex is not wrong. As Feinberg points out,
‘if his impersonal moral outrage is to be the ground of legal coercion and punishment of the
offending party, it must be by virtue of legal moralism—to which the liberal is profoundly
opposed’ (Feinberg 1984b, vol II, p. xiv). However, a content-based approach would go
further and require the state to reinforce the limits of tolerance for illiberal views, which
means explicitly privileging anti-discrimination in conversations about, and assessments
of, harm.
Thomson’s (1990) distinction between different types of distress is worth considering
here (as well as her interesting observation that we all quite enjoy feelings of moral
indignation at times!). For Thomson, there is simple distress (in the sense of a feeling
that one dislikes having) and then there is distress that is caused because we have a certain
belief. Belief-mediated feelings can be held rationally or irrationally, and people bear some
personal responsibility for how long they have these feelings and how intense they are.
Even if the feeling is not irrational, Thomson does not view belief-mediated distress as a
harm. The very word ‘harm’ has a tendency to ‘slither’ (ibid., p. 260), enabling people to
say they have suffered a harm whenever something happens that they would prefer not
to have happened. Indeed, harm is loaded with moral significance, so it can be a useful
strategy or tactic if one wants another to stop doing a particular thing to say that thing is
causing them harm.
One of Thomson’s examples of the ‘slithering of harm’ is particularly relevant here:
the extension of harm to include the worsening of a person’s condition via a worsening of
status. Lilian Ladele ([2010] 1WLR 955) and Gary McFarlane ([2010] EWCA Civ 880) lost
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their jobs because of their refusal to provide services to gay people (civil partnership and
counselling, respectively), and the Bulls had to sell their hotel as a result of their refusal
to let double rooms to same-sex couples. However, according to Thomson, it is not an
infringement per se to cause someone to lose their job (unless the loss were caused by an
infringing act such as spreading lies about them), because ‘the gravamen of the charge
against one who causes a status worsening lies in the means used. If those means are
no infringement of a claim, then causing the status worsening is not either. Thus status
worsenings are not themselves harms’ (Thomson 1990, p. 266). On a Thomsonian view,
then, Ms Ladele, Mr McFarlane, and the Bulls were not harmed by the courts’ judgments.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the Eweida case felt differently, however,
and held that:
[R]ather than holding that the possibility of changing job would negate any inter-
ference with [Article 9], the better approach would be to weight that possibility
in the overall balance when considering whether or not the restriction [on the
right to manifest religious belief] was proportionate ([2013] ECHR 37, [83]).
As part of understanding what such proportionality should mean in practice, the
concepts of dignitary and symbolic harm can be useful. The dignitary harm caused by
discrimination against gay people is more than mere offence or hurt feelings; it leads to
the undermining of social standing—a social harm. From a dignitary harm perspective,
religious objectors are not automatically harmed by the courts’ refusal to grant exceptions
to equality law:
Even if exemptions are refused to service-providers, with some harm to their con-
science, this does not shift the dignitary harm to those that oppose homosexuality
by singling them out as second-class citizens. In fact, the law upholds their equal
social standing through various fundamental rights (Adenitire 2020, p. 280).
Moreover, non-heterosexuals ‘are in no less need of access to basic commercial services
. . . If the law allowed services to be denied to LGB persons it would signal that they do
not have equal social standing and hence are second-class citizens’ (ibid., p. 282). Similarly,
if the state has a responsibility to treat its citizens equally, and to ensure their dignity,
safety and security, it must pay attention to both the ‘symbolic meanings attaching to
social practices and the symbolism of its own pronouncements and silences’ (Boetzkes
2000, p. 327). Homophobia is a harm; organisational homophobia is expressed in reli-
gious exceptions to equality law; individual homophobia is expressed in hate crime but
also in faith-based conscientious objections to equality provisions. If the state permits
exceptions or objections it is not condemning them, and when the state avoids explicitly
condemning homophobia, it can be seen as sustaining it; ‘it is not far-fetched to interpret
non-condemnation as support’ (Nehushtan 2015, p. 154). As this paper will go on to argue,
this also reflects Kendall Thomas’s (1992) characterisation of individual and organisational
homophobia as constructive delegation of state power.
Perhaps religious conservatives are right to be concerned. Reliance on liberal rights
discourse has so far proved a less than effective tool for individual religious conservatives.
It has failed to erode those rights and protections only recently granted to lesbians and
gay men in the Equality Act. This explains the move towards conscience clauses, by
relying on something purportedly ‘higher’ than human law. As the Christian bakery
stated in Lee v Ashers Bakery ([2015] NICty 2), they believed that their business ‘must be
run by God’s wishes’ (ibid.: [22]). On the matter of same-sex marriage, the defendants
stated, ‘the only divinely ordained sexual relationship is that between a man and a woman
within the bonds of matrimony . . . No other form of marriage is permissible according
to God’s law . . . according to God’s law, homosexual relations are sinful . . . ’ (ibid.,
p. 15). The Enlightenment, at least in this sense, has come full circle. There may not be a
medieval theocracy, but there remains a pervasive theonormativity, which is the reason
why appeals to discriminate based on conscience can even be voiced. It is submitted that
theonormativity and heteronormativity operate in a discursive alliance, together providing
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a basis for unequal power relations that harm queer people by limiting their citizenship
and thus their agency. Our understanding of harm can be further improved through a
Foucaultian perspective that recognises the importance of relations of power and their
sedimentation through time.
3.2. A Foucaultian Analysis of Equality and Power
If power is examined through a Foucaultian lens, it is revealed as that which char-
acterises relations between parts of any given society—and between individuals in that
society—as relations of struggle. This approach conceptualises power not as a top-down
mode of domination, but as a more dynamic, unstable set of strategic personal, social and
institutional relations (Foucault 2007). It better describes the changing relations of power
that have operated between law, religion and sexual orientation since the latter half of the
twentieth century. It accounts, with greater analytical precision, for the discursive shifts
that have taken place in religious conservatives’ opposition to increasing equality for les-
bians and gay men. Furthermore, the Foucaultian approach offers a helpful means of both
critiquing this opposition and suggesting a different understanding of sexual orientation
equality.
In applying a Foucaultian understanding of power to equality law, this paper takes
inspiration from Thomas’s argument that US anti-sodomy laws legitimised the homophobic
violence perpetrated by citizens and individual state officers, through the constructive
delegation of state power (Thomas 1993). Taking a Foucaultian perspective, Thomas
contends that we need a broader appreciation of the interests at stake than arguments
based on privacy permit. Thomas’s study of US anti-sodomy laws led him to conclude that
the main question is not about individual rights but about political power relations; this
paper draws on his arguments to reach a similar conclusion regarding UK equality law.
Adopting Foucault’s characterisation of power, Thomas argues that homophobic vio-
lence perpetrated by citizens can be viewed as constructive delegation of power by the state
to those citizens, because private relations have public origins and public consequences.
Religious exceptions and arguments from conscience in equality law—although neither
criminal nor violent in the strict sense—can nevertheless be understood according to similar
principles. If we understand religious exceptions as homophobic harm, they also implicate
the state in the perpetration and perpetuation of homophobia through constructive dele-
gation of power to religious organisations and individuals. The problem is exacerbated
by the Horseman of Famine: the ideologically-driven programme of austerity and the
consequent slashing of social welfare spending, with religious organisations forming part
of the voluntary sector plug in this social support gap. When religious organisations take on
an active role in civil life, it can be argued that ‘such involvement is quasi-governmental in
nature, and ought therefore to be subject to the same constraints that would be imposed on
a government engaged in such an operation’ (MacDougall and Short 2010, p. 141). By con-
tinuing to permit exceptions for religious organisations, the state is permitting homophobia
against society’s most vulnerable queer people. It is submitted that a Queer-informed
analysis of equality law is important in recognising and addressing these issues.
3.3. A Queer Analysis of Equality Law
Legal discourse has the power to shape sexual subjectivities: ‘law constitutes and
regulates, punishes and self-disciplines’ (Cossman 2007, p. 16). This power is found in
equality law; the very framework of anti-discrimination law requires an ‘other’ to use as
a comparator with reference to an established norm. Under the Equality Act, discrimina-
tion on grounds of a protected characteristic is established with reference to a standard
comparator. People of colour, women, people with disabilities, non-heterosexuals and
those who do not conform to gender binaries are compared to the universal legal subject.
Equality law thereby grants protection to those ‘others’ who have been able to show that
they are sufficiently ‘like’ white, male heterosexuals in order for the comparator to be
meaningfully deployed (Halley 2006, p. 109). For example, in the Bull case, the focus was
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on the equivalence of marriage and civil partnership, and the comparator was a hetero-
sexual married couple—the very paradigm of heteronormativity. Except for Lady Hale
([2013] [53]), the Supreme Court had very little to say about the implications of religious
exceptions for sexual citizenship. There was no recognition of the heteronormativity im-
plicit in the equivalence of heterosexual marriage and homosexual civil partnerships. In
effect, homosexual relationships are considered suitable for legal protection if they mirror
traditional heterosexual ones.
Thomas’s concept of constructive delegation helps to illustrate how homophobia
continues to be legitimised by the state through religious exceptions to equality law, and
through the theonormative and heteronormative frameworks that they support. Religious
exceptions provide a space where homophobia is permissible. For the state to allow
‘reasonable accommodation’ of the religious conscience amounts to state facilitation of
sexual prejudice in the public sphere. It enables old anti-gay myths and tropes to be
reactivated at both institutional and individual levels. At this point, a discussion on the
relationship between privacy and power is necessary.
3.4. Power and Privacy
The liberal understanding of privacy sees it as a haven from the external world, in-
cluding the state. This is indeed the image one sees if one looks through a heteronormative
lens. In the liberal state, heterosexuals may have been able to enjoy privacy as an unquali-
fied good; as a zone in which they can express their intimate needs and desires without
interference. This has not been the case for non-heterosexuals, who have had to hide or
‘closet’ their sexual orientation in order to survive within society. As Halperin observes, the
closet offers a zone of protection ‘from the many and virulent sorts of social disqualification
that one would suffer were the discreditable fact of one’s sexual orientation more widely
known’ (Halperin 1995, p. 29). At the same time, this need for individual self-protection
enables society to maintain its heteronormative structure. As Sedgwick recognises, privacy
for lesbians and gay men has enabled society to enjoy ‘the epistemological privilege of
unknowing’ (Sedgwick 2008, p. 5), whereby the veneer of heterosexuality is not tarnished
by a forced recognition of the homosexual ‘other’. Thus, the closet serves as a reminder
of the relations of power that exist with regard to sexuality. Therefore, as Thomas argues,
privacy for non-heterosexuals ‘has always been both a tool and a trap, insofar as privacy has
functionally served as a cornerstone for the very structure of domination that the principle
has been used to attack’ (Thomas 1992, p. 1456), and it is this structure of domination that
is criticised here.
This is precisely why the extension of sexual minority rights beyond the private sphere,
into employment, education and into the marketplace of goods and services, has provided
such a flashpoint for conflict with religion. Religious conservatives have bemoaned their
legal losses, and it is tempting to view sexual orientation as the winner. However, focusing
on court decisions in case law can cloud our understanding of the forces that do (or should)
motivate the law (Moore 1989). This is why an analysis of the power relations involved is
important, and why Thomas advocates a focus on political power when considering the
implications of homosexual sodomy statutes—or, in this case, of religious exemptions to
anti-discrimination law. Thomas reminds the reader that lesbian and gay history ‘is a story
of homophobic aggression and ideology. Its central theme is the fear, hatred, stigmatization
and persecution of homosexuals and homosexuality’ (Thomas 1992, p. 1462). He likens the
constant, underlying threat of homophobic violence to living under the threat of terrorism
(ibid., pp. 1465–66). This paper has earlier discussed how religious conservatives have used
the discourse of war to describe their experience. Thomas uses the discourse of terrorism
to provide a useful insight into the lived experience of lesbians and gay men around the
world—including the UK. This is a bold comparison, which may seem overly dramatic or
exaggerated at first glance, and may explain why the jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been
loath to use Article 3 in the context of gay rights. The following section addresses this by
considering Article 3 in more detail.
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4. Degrading Treatment: Article 3 ECHR
4.1. The Nature of Torture and Degrading Treatment
Article 3 of the European Convention states that ‘no one shall be subjected to torture or
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. The United Nations’ legal definition
of torture has five elements: (i) the nature of the act; (ii) severe pain and suffering; (iii) the
perpetrator’s intention; (iv) the purpose of the torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment (CIDT); and (v) the involvement of public officials (UN Voluntary Fund for
Victims of Torture 2011). In his discussion of conversion ‘therapy’, Romero makes a
convincing case for its inclusion within the legal definition: the methods used satisfy the
word ‘act’; it meets the definition of severe pain and suffering as well as the requirement of
intention; its purpose is either punishment or discrimination; and it has been committed
by public officials (Romero 2009). Placing an act within the ECHR’s hierarchy of severity
established by the ECHR is done on a case-by-case basis. Romero concedes that ‘because
the methods of conversion therapy vary and the victims of conversion therapy vary in
age and vulnerability, it would be difficult to put conversion therapy squarely within one
category’ (i.e., the torture category or the CIDT category) (ibid., p. 224). Nevertheless,
‘conversion therapy satisfies at least degrading treatment, the lowest form of CIDT, because
of its humiliating nature’ (ibid.). This paper contends that religious exemptions to equality
law constitute similarly degrading treatment towards non-heterosexuals.
4.2. The European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated that Article 3, (unlike
Articles 8–11) is an absolute and unqualified right (Ireland v UK, 1978). However, the Court’s
case law has found guidance in principles such as the ‘margin of appreciation’ which have
allowed an element of relativity and subjectivity to seep into its jurisprudence. A member
state’s margin of appreciation is assessed with reference to the ‘legality, legitimacy and
necessity of any restriction by a public authority’ (Johnson 2013, p. 69). It assumes that
individual states are best placed to decide what limitations may be placed on rights as
being necessary in a democratic society (Handyside v UK [1976] ECHR 5). The Court’s
practice under Article 3 has been criticised for being ‘based not on objective criteria but
on the effects of various subjective factors on the particular facts of each case, leading
to decisions which can be hard to reconcile’ (Addo and Grief 1998, p. 514). As Johnson
suggests, the Court has sought to maintain a minimum level of severity before Article 3
can be engaged, so as ‘not to trivialize the substance of the provision or encourage rights
inflation under it’ (Johnson 2013, p. 196). There is some substance to the argument that
using Article 3 in some homophobic situations may trivialise the serious harms that the
provision is aimed at. Moreover, in an echo of the zero-sum game that has resulted from
religion and sexual orientation’s status as protected characteristics in equality law, allowing
Article 3 may lead to its use in cases of anti-religious speech or actions. The following
section examines arguments in favour of using Article 3, before suggesting that there might
be a Queerer alternative.
The Court has defined inhuman treatment as treatment which may ‘cause either actual
bodily harm or intense physical or mental suffering’ (Kudla v Poland, 2000, p. 92), and
degrading treatment as that which can ‘arouse in the victim feelings of fear, anguish and
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them’ (ibid.). The Commission has stated
that the minimum level of severity for ‘inhuman treatment’ is treatment that inflicts ‘severe
mental or physical suffering’ (X v Federal Republic of Germany, no. 9191/90). It is unfortunate
that the threshold for severity might prevent relief being granted in situations other than
where homosexuality is criminalised and gay people are subject to torture. A better way
forward would be to focus on ‘degrading’ rather than ‘inhuman’ treatment, as ‘this focus
on actions that create feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority that humiliate and debase
individuals provides scope to evolve the Court’s interpretation of the Convention in respect
of sexual orientation’ (Johnson 2013, p. 197). Furthermore, the Court views the Convention
as a ‘living instrument’ which recognises the ‘increasingly high standard being required in
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. . . human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater
firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies’ (Selmouni
v France, 1999, p. 101). Once again, a parallel can be drawn with race discrimination. In
Moldovan and Others v Romania (No 2), the Court reiterated that ‘discrimination based on
race can of itself amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Convention’ (2005, para. 113).
Using Article 3 as a basis for sexual orientation discrimination claims represents a
synthesis of a value-based liberal harm principle and the idea of the constructive dele-
gation of state power, into an approach that better captures the harm suffered by sexual
minorities in the public sphere. It would mean that sexual orientation rights claims are
no longer closeted as ‘private’ matters pertaining solely to Article 8, thereby recognising
the citizenship rights of gay people. There are signs of some, if insufficient, movement in
this regard. For example, in Smith and Grady v UK (ECHR 1999-VI), the applicants claimed
that they had been subjected to discriminatory treatment during investigations into their
sexual orientation by the armed forces. They argued that the investigations were ‘based on
crude stereotyping and prejudice [that] denied and caused affront to their individuality
and dignity’ (ibid., p. 119); and that the questioning during the investigation was ‘hurtful
and degrading . . . prurient and offensive’ (ibid.). The applicants did not succeed in meet-
ing the ‘minimum severity’ threshold, but nonetheless the judgment did recognise that,
because degrading treatment causes the recipients ‘feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority
capable of humiliating and debasing them’ (ibid., p. 120), the Court would ‘not exclude
that treatment which is grounded upon a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual
majority against a homosexual minority . . . could, in principle, fall within the scope of
Article 3’ (ibid., p. 121).
The case of Identoba ((2015) ECHR 537) was the first time the ECtHR recognised
that ‘hate crime’ committed against individuals based on sexual orientation amounted
to a violation of Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. Article 3 (taken in
conjunction with Article 14) imposes a positive obligation on member states to ensure
that all individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all prohibited forms of
ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals. This can be read
as supporting Thomas’s concept of constructive delegation, by requiring states to protect
LGBT people from ‘hate speech and serious threats’ and ‘physical abuse’ that cause them to
feel ‘fear, anxiety and insecurity’ (ibid., p. 79). The judgment means that Article 3 requires
states to put in place both preventative and investigative measures to protect LGBT people
who peacefully assemble in public. As Johnson observes, ‘the Court’s message is that states
must have a robust framework of law enforcement that protects LGBT individuals from
ill-treatment motivated by homophobia (Johnson 2015) (ECHR Sexual Orientation Blog,
13 May 2015). It will be interesting to see to what extent the application of Article 3 to
peaceful assembly in public can be built upon in order to protect gay people in public space
generally. It may be regarded as too much of a leap, and may raise further concerns over
trivialisation and dilution of the Convention right. In any event, Identoba can be seen as the
start of a process whereby gay people have the right not to experience degrading public
treatment because of their sexual orientation.
On a global level, the United Nations has recently accepted that:
. . . members of sexual minorities are disproportionately subjected to torture and
other forms of ill-treatment because they fail to conform to socially constructed
gender expectations. Indeed, discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or
gender identity may often contribute to the process of the dehumanisation of the
victim, which is often a necessary condition for torture and ill-treatment to take
place (United Nations Human Rights Council 2015, p. 34).
The UN’s analysis should not only apply to states which have the most draconian
anti-gay legislation. It is not helpful to say to gay people in the UK, “aren’t you lucky
you don’t live in Uganda”? Socially constructed gender expectations permeate Western
democracies just as they do elsewhere; the difference is only a matter of degree.
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Having said all this, there may be an alternative to what some may see as stretching
Article 3 to combat the problem of non-violent homophobia that religious exceptions permit.
It may be that the ultimate solution will come from religious organisations themselves—and
their queer members.
4.3. A Queerer Alternative: Resistances
The battle against the Horseman of Death—the social exclusion caused by limiting
the citizenship of non-heterosexuals—may have to be fought on more than one front.
One answer may be in Queer challenges within the religious organisations. As Foucault
recognised, discourse transmits and produces power/knowledge. Discourse can reinforce
power/knowledge, but discourse also ‘undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and
makes it possible to thwart it’ (1978, p. 101). This possibility relates to the ‘tactical poly-
valence of discourses’ (Patton 2005, pp. 273–74), in that they can be used as opportunities
for resistance. It is important to recognise the resistances that are taking place within
religious organisations and communities, with the voices of LGBTQ+ people of faith now
beginning to be heard. The old tropes have been challenged by religious individuals,
some of whom are also LGBTQ+. For example, Reverend Sharon Ferguson of the Lesbian
and Gay Christian Movement states that ‘no one religion should be able to influence to
such an extent the laws that we put into place’ (Donald 2012, p. 25). The Christian policy
organisation, Ekklesia, has observed that ‘the Church has become conditioned to think
theologically and practically from a top-down perspective using instruments of the state to
get what it wants . . . It has to have its arguments accepted on merit rather than privilege;
it has to lead by example’ (Nehushtan 2015, pp. 14–15).
A significant aspect of this resistance is to do with clergy’s desire to have and to
formalise their same-sex relationships. For example, the current Bishop of Grantham is
the first Bishop to declare that he is in a same-sex (albeit celibate) relationship (Sherwood
2016b). Notably, a senior bishop from the Church’s evangelical wing has called for far-
reaching change in the church’s attitudes to homosexuality and a welcome to Christians
in same-sex relationships (Sherwood 2016a). Unfortunately, words have not translated
into Church action so easily. Jeremy Pemberton, a gay clergyman, was prevented from
taking up a post as a hospital chaplain after marrying his partner, and lost his appeal over
a claim of discrimination against the Church of England (Pemberton v Inwood [2018] EWCA
Civ 564).
5. Conclusions
The concept of harm is typically discussed with reference to the moral limits of the
criminal law. This paper acknowledges that, while equality law does not intervene only
when harm (or offence) is found, harm is rightly considered in matters of discrimination.
A finding of discrimination in equality law does not necessarily hinge on establishing
harm—whether that takes the form of wrongful setbacks to interests, status worsening,
dignitary harm or symbolic harm—but harm still matters when thinking about inequality.
The arguments presented in this paper are based on a Queer engagement with value-based
liberalism: a recognition that it is the content of any conscience-based arguments that
matters, and the content must be seen in the context of hetero- and theonormative power
relations.
In the context of goods and services provision, for example, equality law has two
purposes. First, the law aims to prevent service providers from discriminating against
customers on the grounds of their protected characteristics. The second, broader purpose
is to prevent service providers from acting upon their discriminatory views when they
provide services to the general public. Service providers are thus prevented from refusing
to provide a service, if their refusal is based on an adverse judgment about others because of
their protected characteristics (Nehushtan and Coyle 2019). With regard to both purposes,
the consequences of the discriminatory act—including whether harm is caused—are not
necessary for a finding of discrimination. Equality law holds direct discrimination to
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be inherently wrong regardless of its actual consequences, because service providers are
not allowed to put their discriminatory views into practice—whether harm (or offence)
is caused. The purpose of equality law is broader than preventing harm or offence; its
purpose is to prevent service providers from discriminating in their service provision.
This is clear when we consider that a refusal to provide a service because the service
provider holds homophobic views is illegal, regardless of whether the customer is in fact
gay. Therefore, while discrimination does not hinge on establishing harm, harm is still
relevant in both a “real” and a symbolic sense.
Notwithstanding the extension of equality law to include gay people in its embrace,
religious exceptions remain. It is important to recognise the harm caused by homophobia,
and to look beyond the scope of the criminal law to recognise the degrading treatment
caused by discrimination. Discrimination on sexual orientation grounds must be recognised
as homophobia, even if it is cloaked in the language of rights or conscience. Homophobic
discrimination is validated by religious exceptions that limit gay people’s access to full and
equal citizenship. Allowing religious exceptions is itself an expression of homophobia at an
institutional level; an expression that is based on the hetero- and theo- norms that continue
to pervade society. Discrimination on sexual orientation grounds is not simply an affront
to the victim’s dignity—it produces and perpetuates discursive effects on a societal level.
These real harms should be recognised in the context of equality law, not least to counter
the arguments put forward by religious conservatives that gay people now have ‘enough’
equality—and that, indeed, the pendulum has swung too far the other way, so that the
religious conscience is now ‘closeted’ instead of the gay person. Hence, this paper contends
that such discrimination can be understood as degrading treatment and constructive
delegation of homophobia, and the law should be amended to recognise this. Whether
the solution lies in extending the scope of Article 3 ECHR remains a matter of debate. The
concerns over trivialisation, as well as the threat of it being counter-deployed by religious
conservatives, mean that extending its embrace may prove to be unsuccessful. The moves
made by queer members of religious organisations offer hope, but the courts have yet to
endorse their claims. It seems that the conflict between religion and sexual orientation in
equality law is not over; the Four Horsemen of Homophobia may be battle-scarred, but
they live on.
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